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Furthermore, the recent amendment to section 501(c) does not
contravene, and perhaps implicitly codifies, the Fe Bland mandate
that a combined reading of all the relevant documents must permit
the imposition of a flip tax. Thus, shareholder approval of any flip
tax will still be required, and although the statute has retroactive
application, a transfer fee imposed without shareholder approval
prior to the date of the new legislation would be an invalid exercise
of corporate power.
Alexander Sokoloff

CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

CPLR 203(e): Plaintiff may assert an otherwise time-barredclaim
against a third-partydefendant if court in its discretionfinds defendant had notice of the claim and amended complaint relates
back to service of third-party complaint.
CPLR 203(e) allows a plaintiff, in amending a timely complaint, to include an otherwise time-barred claim, provided the
original pleading has given sufficient notice of the transactions or
occurrences "to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading."1
CPLR 203(e) was enacted to overcome case law which prohibited
'See CPLR 203(e) (McKinney 1972). CPLR 203(e) provides:
A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at
the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original
pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.
Id. Section 203(e) was based on Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that an amendment may relate back only if the claim against the new party arose
out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth in the original pleading and if the
party sought to be added knew or should have known of the institution of the suit. See 1
WK&M 203.29, at 2-118.16 (1986); The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 283, 284
(1966); The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 467, 467 (1967); see also M. GREEN,
BASIC Civa. PROCEDURE 135 (2d ed. 1979) (relation back theory underlying Rule 15(c)).
The practical effect of CPLR 203(e) was to necessitate that a defendant make a comprehensive, timely examination of all facts surrounding the transaction to anticipate potential claims which could be added later. See, e.g., Henegar v. Freudenheim, 40 App. Div. 2d
825, 826, 337 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (2d Dep't 1972) (amendment to assert lack of informed
consent permitted in medical malpractice action); Watso v. City of New York, 39 App. Div.
2d 960, 961, 333 N.Y.S.2d 492, 493 (2d Dep't 1972) (amendment of wrongful death complaint to allege assault as well as negligence); see also, The Biannual Survey, 39 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 178, 184-85 (1964).
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amended pleadings from asserting obligations or liabilities not
originally pleaded before the statute of limitations for those claims
had expired.2 Courts have interpreted the statute liberally,3 allowing amendments to pleadings to relate back to the original filing date in instances where a party seeks to add a wrongful death
claim to a personal injury action4 or to change the capacity in
which a party appears in a lawsuit.5 The law has remained unsetI

See SECOND REP. 50, 51 (1958). CPLR 203(e) had no counterpart in prior practice

statutes, but was intended to overcome caselaw resulting from Harriss v. Tams, 258 N.Y.
229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932). See SECOND REP. at 51. The court in Harrissheld that a defendant
need only investigate those facts relevant to a defense against the cause of action stated in
the complaint, and that an amendment which changes the legal theory of recovery is based
on "different" conduct, thus such an amendment would be prejudicial to a defendant. See
258 N.Y. at 243-44, 179 N.E. at 482.
Prior to the enactment of CPLR 203(e), courts had consistently held that amendments
to assert claims against third party defendants did not relate back. See McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods. Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 553, 223 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd without
opinion, 11 N.Y.2d 963, 183 N.E.2d 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1962); Paskes v. Buonaguro, 42
Misc. 2d 1004, 249 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964); Spen & Co. v. Ocean Box
Corp., 16 Misc. 2d 436, 184 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959).
' See, e.g., In re Smith 104 App. Div. 2d 445, 448, 478 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966 (2d Dep't
1984) (CPLR 203(e) liberally construed to allow "affidavit" as valid amendment to original
petition); Imperial Outfitters to Large Men, Inc. v. Genesco, Inc., 95 App. Div. 2d 755, 756,
464 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (1st Dep't 1983) (cross-claim raised in amended pleading deemed to
have been interposed when complaint served). CPLR 104 requires that CPLR provisions
"be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
civil judicial proceeding." CPLR 104 (McKinney 1972); see also, Spallina v. Giannoccaro, 98
App. Div. 2d 103, 108, 469 N.Y.S.2d 824, 827 (4th Dep't 1983) (although pleading rules are
construed liberally, mere conclusory assertions are insufficient to enable defendants to respond); Shaw v. Hospital Ass'n of Schenectady, 57 Misc. 2d 461, 461, 292 N.Y.S.2d 984, 985
(Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1968) (in light of liberal construction of CPLR, deposition
may be taken where party unable to attend trial); Hardenburg v. Hardenburg, 42 Misc. 2d
818, 819, 248 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1964) (although CPLR liberally
construed, pretrial examinations not allowed in matrimonial actions without showing special
circumstances). See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, H. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
5.26 at 302 (1985) (trend away from strict technical pleading).
I See, e.g., Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 319 N.E.2d 174, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1974);
Vastola v. Maer, 48 App. Div. 2d 561, 370 N.Y.S. 2d 955 (2d Dep't 1975); aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d
1019, 355 N.E.2d 300, 387 N.Y.S2d 246 (1976); Palmer v. New York City Transit Auth., 37
App. Div. 2d 766, 324 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1971). See generally 1 WK&M 1 203.30, at 2102 to 2-105 (1986) (discussing Caffaro decision and its effects on wrongful death and other
claims).
I See, e.g., Boyd v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co., 187 N.Y. 262, 79 N.E. 999
(1907); Rivera v. St. Luke's Hosp., 102 Misc. 2d 727, 424 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. Orange
County 1980); Princeton Textile Printing Corp. v. Peek Paper Corp., 195 Misc. 955, 91
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afl'd without opinion, 275 App. Div. 1024, 91 N.Y.S.
827 (1st Dep't 1949). See generally 1 WK&M %203.34, at 2-118.26 to 2-118.30 (1986) (discussing CPLR 203(e) as it allows amended complaints to change capacity of parties to
action).
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tied, however, as to whether section 203(e) permits a plaintiff to
assert an otherwise time-barred claim within an amended complaint against a third-party defendant who was served with the
third-party summons and complaint within the prescribed statu7 the
tory period.6 Recently, in Duffy v. Horton Memorial Hospital,
Court of Appeals settled the controversy, holding that it is within
the discretion of the court to allow amendment of the complaint to
include a time-barred claim against a third-party defendant, provided that the third-party complaint had been served before the
statute of limitations ran, and that such service gave the party notice of a possible claim. 8
The plaintiff in Duffy commenced a medical malpractice action in August, 1979 against the defendant hospital,9 alleging that
the hospital had failed to recognize and diagnose an early stage of
lung cancer.1 0 In June, 1981, the hospital brought a timely third' The First, Second and Fourth Departments have held that an amended complaint
relates back to service of the third-party complaint. See Cucuzza v. Vaccaro, 109 App. Div.
2d 101, 103, 490 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (2d Dep't 1985); Holst v. Edinger, 93 App. Div. 2d 313,
315, 461 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (1st Dep't 1983); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 App. Div. 2d 55, 60, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Dep't 1980); see also
Landi v. We're Assocs., Inc., 124 Misc. 2d 331, 336, 475 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1983) (amended complaint against third-party defendant should relate back).
The Cucuzza decision represents the Second Department's recent departure from its
stance in a long line of cases holding that CPLR 203(e) does not allow relation back in
third-party actions. See 109 App. Div. 2d at 103, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 520. The Second Department was, in fact, the first Appellate Division presented with this set of facts. See Trybus v.
Nipark Realty Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 563, 271 N.Y.S.2d 5 (2d Dep't 1966). The Trybus
court held that CPLR 203(e) refers to notice as of the time of service of the original complaint, and therefore there can be no relation back of service against a third party who does
not receive notice until service of the third-party complaint. See id. at 564, 271 N.Y.S.2d at
6; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Emsco Homes Inc., 93 App. Div. 2d 874, 874-75, 461 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430
(2d Dep't 1983). The Third Department, however, has strictly construed CPLR 203(e) to
refer only to relation back to the time that the "originalpleading" was interposed and not
to the service of the third-party complaint. See St. Johnsville v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 93
App. Div. 2d 932, 933, 462 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (3d Dep't 1983) (emphasis in original); Knorr
v. City of Albany, 58 App. Div. 2d 904, 905, 396 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (3d Dep't 1977). The
Third Department has been reluctant to recognize relation back even when a plaintiff attempts to assert a claim against a defendant who has been a party to the action from the
outset. See Howard v. Hachigian, 88 App. Div. 2d 1064, 1065, 452 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (3d
Dep't 1982).
7 66 N.Y.2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 820, 497 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1985).
8 See id. at 478, 488 N.E.2d at 823, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
0 See id. at 475, 488 N.E.2d at 821, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
10 See id. The plaintiff's husband died in May, 1981, and leave was granted to amend
the complaint to add a wrongful death claim. Id. Such amendments are granted when death
results from the same injury upon which the original action was based. See Caffaro v.
Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 319 N.E.2d 174, 176, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (1974); supra note 4
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party action against the family physician who had treated the decedent prior and subsequent to the hospital's examination.1 1 The
plaintiff sought to amend her original complaint in October, 1982
to name this physician as a defendant,12 because an independent
action against him was barred by the statute of limitations. 3 The
plaintiff asserted that, pursuant to CPLR 203(e), this claim was
not time-barred since the amended complaint related back to the
4
time of service of the third-party complaint.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, initially granted leave to
amend, but upon reargument, followed precedent in the Third Department and denied the motion to amend on the ground that the
plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.15 The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed;'" the court refused
to adopt the First, Second and Fourth Departments' interpretation
of CPLR 203(e), which allows such an amendment to relate back. 17
The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the matter to the
Third Department, giving that court the opportunity to exercise its
discretion in determining whether the plaintiff's amendment was
warranted.18
Judge Titone, writing for a unanimous court, conceded that
CPLR 203(e) does not by its terms refer to third-party proceedings,'" but nevertheless applied it by analogy, reasoning that such
application was proper judicial construction, and consistent with
the policies underlying the statute of limitations. 20 The court noted
and accompanying text. The addition of the wrongful death claim does not "expand the
scope of proof or the relevant legal considerations" because the defendant will already be
preparing to defend based on the injury. Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d at 251, 319 N.E.2d at
177, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
11 66 N.Y.2d at 475, 488 N.E.2d at 820, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
12 Id. at 475, 488 N.E.2d at 821-22, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92. A deposition of Dr. Greenberg, the family physician, was taken in October, 1982, after which the plaintiff sought the
amendment. Id. Subsequently, Dr. Greenberg died and the executrices of his estate were
substituted as third-party defendants. Id. at 475 n.1, 488 N.E.2d at 821, 487 N.Y.S.2d at
891.
" Id. at 475, 488 N.E.2d at 822, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
14

Id.

16 Id.
10 See 109 App. Div. 2d 927, 486 N.Y.S.2d 402 (3d Dep't 1985).
"I See id. at 928, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
"9 See 66 N.Y.2d at 478, 488 N.E.2d at 823-24, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94. CPLR 5613
directs the Court of Appeals to remit a case to the Appellate Division to consider matters of
fact which were not raised in the previous proceeding. See CPLR 5613 (McKinney 1978).
'9 See 66 N.Y.2d at 476-77, 488 N.E.2d at 822-23, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93; See also
supra note 1 (text of CPLR 203(e)).
20 See 66 N.Y.2d at 477, 488 N.E.2d at 823, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
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that statutes of limitation are specifically designed to protect defendants from the burden of adjudicating stale claims and to prevent such claims from clogging an already overtaxed judicial
system.2
The Duffy court recognized that an amendment relating back
to the original filing date of a complaint, as applied to the parties
already before the court, is not in conflict with these policies. 2 The
court noted, however, that a more difficult case arises when an
amendment is sought to add a new party against whom the statute
of limitations has run. 23 Judge Titone resolved this difficulty, stating that such an amendment is permissible if the court finds that,
within the statutory period, the potential defendant has been
made fully aware of the claim against him with respect to the
transactions or occurrences in the suit, and is in fact a participant
in the litigation.24
It is submitted that the court's approach in Duffy strikes an
appropriate balance: it avoids a blanket adoption of relation back
in third-party actions which would unjustly burden defendants unable to prepare an adequate defense, yet it permits courts to recognize a valid claim when the facts indicate that the third-party defendant was on notice of the possible claim.2 5 This holding is
2 See 66 N.Y.2d at 477, 488 N.Y.2d at 823, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 892. Statutes of limitations

are designed to "promote justice by preventing surprise through revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared." Burnett v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).
The statute of limitations is also based on the theory that there is a reasonable time within
which a person of ordinary diligence would bring an action. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden
Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969).
For a discussion of the purposes of the statute of limitations, see 2 CARMODY-WAIT 2D,
NEW YORK PRACTICE § 13:1, at 296-97 (1982); J. FRIEDENTHAL, H. KANE & A. MILLER, CIvIL
PROCEDURE § 5.27 at 305 (1985); F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.16 at 218-19
(3d ed. 1985); 1 WK&M %201.01, at 2-7 (1986); Developments in the Law: Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950).
2 See 66 N.Y.2d at 477, 488 N.E.2d at 823, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 893. The court stated that
amendments which "merely add a new theory of recovery or defense arising out of a transaction or occurrence already in litigation does not conflict with these policies," because "a
party is likely to have collected and preserved available evidence relating to the entire transaction or occurrence and the defendant's sense of security has already been disturbed by the
pending action." Id. (citations omitted).
22 See id. According to the court, "if the new defendant has been a complete stranger to
the suit" when the amendment is sought, the bar of the statute of limitations must stand.
Id.
24 See id. at 477-78, 488 N.E.2d at 823, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
2' See SIEGEL, § 49 at 17-18 (1985 Supp.). Professor Siegel notes that allowing the
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consistent with the trend away from formalized pleading rules towards the adjudication of claims on their merits.2 6 This approach
will protect plaintiffs whose potential claims against third-party
defendants do not surface until the litigation process has commenced and the statute of limitations has expired.
It is suggested, however, that the court could have based its
holding solely on the statutory procedures of the CPLR which provide for requisite notice to third-party defendants.17 By arguing
that the policies underlying the statute of limitations are a sufficient basis upon which to extend a statutory provision beyond its
amendment to relate back is more consistent with the CPLR's rule of liberal construction
(CPLR 104) and with the principal purpose of the statute of limitations-notice to the
party of the transaction plaintiff's amendment to include a direct claim against a thirdparty defendant under CPLR 203(e) can be analogized to the relation back under CPLR
203(b), which provides that timely service on one of several parties "united in interest"
satisfies the statute of limitations with respect to all of them. See Farrell, Civil Practice
1982 Survey of New York Law, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 25, 34 (1983). The rationale underlying
CPLR 203(b) is that a defendant who is not named in the original complaint may not be a
stranger to the action; in fact the parties may be so intertwined that service upon one may
be deemed notice to the other, sufficient to satisfy the policies of the statute of limitations.
See Connell v. Hayden, 83 App. Div. 2d 30, 39-41, 443 N.V.S.2d 383, 391-92 (2d Dep't 1981).
CPLR 203(b), however, is akin to CPLR 203(e) in that it does not offer automatic relation
back of all claims. See Brock v. Bua, 83 App. Div. 2d 61, 66-67, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410-11 (2d
Dep't 1981).
20 Compare Vastola v. Maer, 48 App. Div. 2d 561, 564-65, 370 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (2d
Dep't 1975) (service of notice of motion and proposed amended complaint prior to expiration of statute of limitations timely interposes claims asserted) (emphasis added), aff'd, 39
N.Y.2d 1019, 355 N.E.2d 300, 387 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1976) with Arnold v. Mayal Realty Co., 299
N.Y. 57, 85 N.E.2d 616 (1949) (service of notice of motion is not equivalent to service of
summons and complaint, therefore statute of limitations is a defense). See generally J.
FRIEDENTHAL,

M.

KANE

& A.

MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 5.26 at 302 (1985) (impact of im-

proper pleading softened by liberal amendment rules available in most jurisdictions). Statutes of limitation in particular are construed where possible to give parties their day in
court and should not be subjected to overstrict construction. Hotaling v. General Elect. Co.,
16 App. Div.2d 339, 228 N.Y.S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1962), afl'd, 12 N.Y.2d 310, 239 N.Y.S.2d
344 (1963); Callarama v. Associates Discount Corp. of Del., 69 Misc.2d 287, 329 N.Y.S.2d
711, (Sup. Ct. New York County 1972).
27 See CPLR 1007-1009 (McKinney 1976). When a third-party action is commenced,
the third-party plaintiff must serve the third-party defendant with a copy of all prior pleadings, including the plaintiff's original complaint. CPLR 1007 (McKinney 1976). The thirdparty plaintiff must also serve the plaintiff with a copy of the third-party complaint, id., and
the third-party answer, when he receives it. CPLR 1009 (McKinney 1976). The statute authorizes the third-party defendant to assert any defenses he may have against the plaintiff
at this time. CPLR 1008 (McKinney 1976). The plaintiff may assert a direct claim against
the third-party defendant by right within 20 days of service of the third-party defendant's
answer. CPLR 1009 (McKinney 1976). It is submitted that these provisions provide for such
an interaction between the parties that it is reasonable to ascribe notice to the third-party
defendant at this time, absent a showing to the contrary.
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express terms, the court has opened the door to a more liberal
reading of the statute of limitations which could hinder, rather
than advance, its purposes.2 8
Jean Townley Nichols

CPLR § 302(b): Jurisdiction over a nonresident in an equitable
distribution action following a foreign divorce will be controlled
by the matrimonial "long-arm" statute
CPLR 302(b) permits the courts of New York to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in certain matri28

Parties have already begun to utilize CPLR 203(e) in ways not contemplated by the

statute, nor by the court of appeals in Duffy. See, e.g., Leibman v. Schlossberg's Atlas Boiler
and Welding Co., 57 App. Div. 2d 820, 820, 395 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (lst Dep't 1977); T.R.
America Chems. Inc., v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 116 Misc. 2d 874, 456 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1982). In T.R. America, the court held that CPLR 203(e) could be used by the
third-party defendant to amend his third-party answer to assert a cause of action in defamation against the original plaintiff beyond the one year statute of limitations, since the
claim arose out of the same transactions upon which plaintiff's claim was based. See T.R.
America, at 887, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 617. Since the amendment was sought against the plaintiff,
the court held that the amendment related back to the date that the plaintiff instituted a
suit against the defendant, not the time when the answer to the third-party complaint was
interposed. See id. at 886, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
In Leibman, the court held that where a plaintiff attempted to serve its amended complaint before expiration of the statutory period, but after the 20 days allowed by CPLR 1009
to amend of right without leave of the court, and the proper amended complaint was not
served until after the three year statute of limitations had expired, the proper amended
complaint related back. See Liebman, at 820, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The court stated that
since all of the relevant information was exchanged before the limitation had expired, to
hold any differently would be "an exaltation of form over substance." Id. at 820, 395
N.Y.S.2d at 24. Cf. Tri-City Elec. Co. v. People, 96 App. Div. 2d 146, 151, 468 N.Y.S.2d 283,
287 (4th Dep't 1983) (amendment relates back even though class action suit was not proper
posture in which to bring suit), af'd, 63 N.Y.2d 969, 473 N.E.2d 240, 483 N.Y.S.2d 990
(1984).
The Appellate Division, Second Department, has distinguished between a situation
where the plaintiff is aware of the third-party's involvement and lets the statute of limitations expire without bringing him into the suit, and a case where the third-party knows that
his involvement was not manifest to the plaintiff, and therefore it would not be reasonable
to conclude that the plaintiff has made a conscious choice not to sue. See Brock v. Bua, 83
App. Div. 2d 61, 70-71, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407, 413 (2d Dep't 1981).
At least one federal court has construed Rule 15(c) to allow relation back in a third
party action, even if the third-party complaint was not served within the statutory period.
See Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 37 (D.C. Cal. 1966); supra note 1 (discussing Rule 15(c) as model for CPLR 203(e)).

